Two Paths

There are truly only two paths at the moment. Yes, there are many possible decisions, yet each decision falls on one of two paths that each major faction of the political environment in Egypt may take.

Amidst the honeymoon that was the first 18 days of the revolution, it was beyond our thoughts that our ‘comrades’ in the revolution would, at some point along the path, focus all their attention against us. We all stood together in the same squares, marched together through the same streets, bled together in the same battles, and waited together through the harshest moments of those 18 days. We had one goal, one enemy, and a belief that if either of us takes a step back, we would both fail and lose.

What each of us failed to take into consideration was the other’s rock-solid belief in his ideology and political thought. The liberal, the leftist, and the secularist believed that some separation between faith and state must exist, while the Islamist believed that it is impossible to accept a state that has no links or ties to Islam.

Through every referendum and election, the Islamists managed to make it to the presidential palace, and form a constitution (albeit with a number of compromises).

Through losses at the polls, the liberals, leftists, and seculars ended up being the opposition, failing to dissuade the population from a yes vote in the first referendum, failing to persuade the population to elect a majority in both lower and upper houses of the parliament, failing to persuade the population to vote for their presidential candidates, and failing to dissuade the population from a yes vote in the final constitutional referendum.

The opposition has also attempted to take to the streets and try to force its demands through protests, with little, if any success.

With the emergence of the anarchist group, the ‘Black Bloc,’ here in Egypt, the opposition’s recent protests to mark the second anniversary of the January 25th revolution have turned violent, with clashes in many provinces (with the exception of Upper Egypt, where almost no protests were made) and attempts (both failed and successful) at breaking into and looting governmental and private property.

In the meantime, Islamist groups enjoy a strong ground support, at the ready to take to the streets at any moment, organized, mobile, and widespread, with a heavy presence in Upper Egypt, western Egypt (mainly Marsa Matruh), and Sinai. And the Islamist youth are impatient as they watch headquarters from their parties being ransacked, and the elected present under threat.

Both the Islamists and the opposition have 2 paths to choose from.

The opposition may either decide to give up on the ballots all together, and take on to the streets to force whatever change they would like, and enjoy the militant support of the Black Bloc in the face of any security personnel.

Or, on the other hand, they may give up on the protests, take to the streets in a different fashion, by helping rebuild the society and win hearts and minds, and try to persuade people to vote for them at the ballot, though it will definitely take a very long time to reap the harvest of their efforts.

 

The Islamists may decide to stand their ground, remain patient amid the insults and injuries, and either wait out the storm, or watch as the system collapses under the hands of the Black Bloc and the opposition forces, and sustain pressure from the youth to counter the opposition on the streets.

Or, on the other hand, they may take to the streets as they did at the Ettihadiya Palace weeks ago, clash with the opposition and the Black Bloc, and either force the opposition out of politics, or reach a violent stalemate that will end up in a civil war.

 

Either way, one thing is certain, the results of the clashes between opposition rioters and security forces will definitely play a major role in both factions’ decisions.

Blown out of Proportion

I’m sure, a day ago, very few would have even heard of the film that has become the center of the news today. What was but a mention on the streets of some Islamic countries has grabbed attention from every media outlet, not because of the film itself and its attack on Islam, but because of the response that I would describe as immature.

What was supposedly supposed to be a peaceful protest changed entirely when a group of members of the Ultras White Knights (a group of young ultra-fanatical lovers of a sports club in Egypt) joined the protest.

A group of youth climbed the wall that encircled the American embassy, and took down the star-spangled banner, replacing it with a flag bearing the famous ‘Testimony of Faith.’

The anniversary of 9/11 has become an annual attempt at instigating anger among the Muslims around the world. It was just last year, if I am not mistaken, that an announcement was made that there would be a burning of the Quran. Uproar also occurred, and it died down later.

The energy caused by the anger should have been used to promote the Message of the Prophet Muhammed (Peace be upon him), rather than injure a promise made by the nation that no embassy would be attacked.

Invading an embassy in one’s own country that the nation is obligated to protect, and the burning of a flag is more of a display of a weakness, than it is of strength.

It is no sign of bravery and strength to break into a room in one’s home. But displaying the truth and standing by it against the storm is what we need to practice.

Much Change

Much change has occurred since the last post I made. (I was busy fixing my laptop, unfortunately).

Miracles occurred faster than expected. The ‘spare', as he was nicknamed, won the presidential elections. Morsi utilized the Sinai incident that killed over a dozen Egyptian soldiers to end the decades-long reign of the military, finally establishing a civilian rule over the country. A new government has been formed, with Hesham Kandil at its head. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces underwent changes. And many members and followers of the old regime have been swept away.

And more is yet to come.

The Status

The current position of many who claim that fraud will be prevalent in the second round and won’t vote remind me of the age old question: What would you do if you knew that you have 24 hours left to live?

I mean, would you truly just sit there, watch what happens, and just accept it as it comes, or would you do your part, vote, and help prevent fraud?

Would you sit and wait for death, or actually do something useful before it comes?

Would you sit and wait for Shafiq to win, or actually do something useful and try to prevent him from winning?

Random Thought of the Week

Whenever an entity is placed at a position above the truth and the people, be that entity a man or government, it is bound to become corrupt for believing itself to be wiser than all whom he governs.

For that reason, the concept of socialism eventually leads to a corrupt government, for the government, believing itself to know what is best for those it governs, finds itself more worthy of governing than those outside its ranks.

The Face-Off that ended in a Draw

The Egyptian revolution is arriving at the most crucial stop along its path. One of the greatest political battles in the history of Egypt and the Middle East is unfolding.

On the 12^th of February, 2011, it would have seemed outlandish if we were told that Omar Suleiman would run for the next presidential elections. Just 2 days before that date, Hosni Mubarak had delegated presidential authority to Omar Suleiman. And on the 11^th of February, 2011, the whole world watched as Omar Suleiman announced that presidential authority was being transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after millions protested at the public squares throughout the nation demanding that both Mubarak and Suleiman step down.

Yet, as politics in this world has always been, those who took part in the revolution were in for a surprise on the 8^th of April, 2012. On that day, and just minutes before the doors were closed for nominations, Omar Suleiman nominated himself (with thousands of signatures he miraculously collected within 24 hours).

A few days earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood made a tactical change in plans. The Brotherhood had – on the 10^th of February, 2011, to be exact – promised not to field out a candidate for presidency, expecting, in return, understanding and cooperation from other ideological groups in Egypt, and assuming the good intentions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. As a response to both political isolation (on the intellectual-level, despite a continuing street-support and winning elections in various syndicates and universities) and a lack of cooperation between the parliament and the SCAF, the Brotherhood decided to send out perhaps one of their best – Khairat El Shater.

Those 2 men represented the decades-old rivalry between Egypt’s greatest political powers: the old National Democratic Party that, during Mubarak’s reign, governed Egypt; and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group that Mubarak, Sadat, and Nasser had always feared as their real rival political force.

Omar Suleiman was a formidable column in the old structure, he supported Mubarak’s reign from behind curtains. Khairat ElShater was a formidable column within the Muslim Brotherhood, he helped finance the organization and played a major role in forming its political strategies and, after the 11^th of February, 2011, worked hard towards formulating the organization’s economic, social, and political program for the nation (which he named مشروع النهضة, or the Revival Project).

Omar Suleiman gained a reputation similar to Vlad the Impaler, a man with no heart, who would kill, decapitate, and torture at will without hesitation. Khairat El Shater has gained a reputation of a powerbroker and a political mastermind, a man (it has been said) who controlled and lead one of the country’s most powerful political forces from behind bars and so persuasive that his foes respect his skill.

Quite surprisingly, destiny had it that both candidates would be banned from the competition. Omar Suleiman did not fulfill the geographical-numerical requirements regarding the nominations that were required to be considered a candidate. Khairat El Shater’s previous politically-motivated legal cases (from which he received pardon) prevented him from running.

At the moment, 13 names remain as candidates, and still, anything remains possible.

The Latest Milestone

The Egyptian Revolution, which began with protests that took place on the 25th of January, 2011, is reaching its latest, and one of the most crucial milestones.
The doors of new presidential-candidacy nominations closed today at 2:00 pm. And the competition is just getting started.
On the 23rd and 24th of May, 2012, Egyptians will head to the polling stations (those living abroad will be heading to Egyptian embassies and consulates) to elect the first freely-elected president of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1 year, 3 months, and 12 days after the people successfully toppled Egypt’s last pharaoh.
Prior to that date, on the 26th of April, the final list of candidates for the presidency of Egypt will be announced. And prior to that date, the Presidential Elections Council will announce whether any of the currently-listed candidates does not actually fulfill the requirements and criteria stated by law and the constitution.
And the current list is as follows:

1. Ahmed Aoud AlSaeedy (Nominated by the Egypt National Party [حزب مصر القومي])
2. Abu ElEzz AlHariry (Nominated by the Socialist Popular Alliance Party [حزب التحالف الشعبي الاشتراكي])
3. Mohamed Fawzy Eisa (Nominated by the Democratic Generation Party [حزب الجيل الديمقراطي])
4. Hossam KhairAllah (Nominated by the Democratic Peace Party [حزب السلام الديمقراطي])
5. Amr Moussa (Nominated by over 40,000 citizens)
6. Abd ElMeniem Abu ElFetouh (Nominated by over 40,000 citizens)
7. Hazem Salah Abu Ismael (Nominated by over 150,000 citizens and 47 members of parliament)
8. Hesham ElBastawisi (Nominated by the National Progressive Unionist Party [حزب التجمع الوطني التقدمي الوحدوي])
9. Mahmoud Hussam (Nominated by over 30,000 citizens)
10. Ibraheem Ghareib (Nominated by over 30,000 citizens)
11. Mohamed Sileem ElAwa (Nominated by 30 members of parliament)
12. Mohamed Khairat ElShater (Nominated by 277 members of parliament)
13. Ahmed Shafeeq (Nominated by over 60,000 citizens)
14. Hamdeen Sabbahy (Nominated by over 40,000)
15. Ayman Nour (Nominated by the New Egyptian Tomorrow Party [حزب غد الثورة المصري الجديد])
16. Mamdouh Qotb (Nominated by the Civilization Party [حزب الحضارة])
17. Abdallah AlAshaal (Nominated by the Authenticity Party [حزب الأصالة])
18. Khalid Ali (Nominated by 32 members of parliament)
19. Mohamed Moursi (Nominated by the Freedom and Justice Party)
20. Omar Suleiman (Nominated by over 30,000 citizens)
21. Hussam Khairat (Nominated by the Egypt Arab Socialist Party)
22. Ashraf Barouma (Nominated by the Egypt ‘Kenana’ Party [حزب مصر الكنانة])
23. Murtada Mansour (Nominated by the Egypt National Party [حزب مصر القومي])

The first 2 names were officially nominated on the 13th of March, 2012, and the last 7 names were officially nominated on the last day for nominations, the 4th of April, 2012.
The representation of ideologies and perspectives and identities is extremely variant in the list of candidates. Hazem Salah Abu Ismael represents the Salafist ideology. A number of socialist parties pushed forth their own candidates, including Hussam Khairat and Abu ElEzz AlHariry. 2 candidates come from pan-Arab perspectives, AbdAllah Alashaal and Hamdeen Sabbahy. (What is interesting about Alashaal’s nomination is that the Salafist Alasala (Authenticity) Party were those who nominated him).
And on opposing sides, we find 2 Muslim Brotherhood candidates and 4 pro-Mubarak candidates. On the MB corner we find Khairat ElShater and Mohamed Moursi (who is seen as a reserve-candidate in case Khairat ElShater is taken off the list for any reason), and on the pro-Mubarak corner we find Murtada Mansour, Amr Moussa, Ahmed Shafeeq, and (former chief of intelligence) Omar Suleiman.
This is, perhaps, the election of the century. And anything is possible to happen.

THE UNVEILING OF THE CONSPIRACY

Previously, I wasn’t very inclined to agree with conspiracy theories. Yet the conspiracy that is beginning to unfold and unveil itself here, in Egypt, is perhaps one of the most outstanding and realistic conspiracies in history.
The curtains began to open to reveal this conspiracy a few days ago. However, the actual plan was already in effect since (perhaps and most probably) the 11th of February. In what many saw as a noble and honorable action on the part of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Omar Suleiman announced the transfer of presidential power to the Military Council. And all of Egypt erupted in celebration. Yet it was in that act (that many at that time considered to be patriotic) that the conspiracy (may have been) hatched.
It is no secret to anybody who has paid attention or read into Egyptian politics over that last 3 decades (and 6, if we were to take into account Sadat and AbdelNasser’s reign) that the ruling authorities have always had a sense of animosity towards the Muslim Brotherhood. There was perhaps not 1 year during those years in which at least one prison was empty of a member of the Brotherhood. And there was not 1 media organization that had even the slightest ties with the ruling system that did not spread (false) accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood. It seemed as though the ruling powers only had 2 things they worried about: corrupting the nation and attacking the Brotherhood.
And anybody with an understanding of the nature and personality of the majority of the Egyptian people, as well as the real potential and popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood had an understanding as to what to expect with regards to power shifts once the revolution toppled the old pharaoh.  The Brotherhood would have eventually gained unrivaled power in the political system. (Yet to the surprise of many, the Salafists came around to become the Brotherhood’s main political competitor.)
And the old gang would stop at nothing to prevent that from happening.
Looking back at the post-Mubarak events, it seems that the first step in the conspiracy (that one group later saw as a plot to divide the revolutionary front and another group saw as an early lesson and practice in democracy and elections) was actually an attempt at portraying the Brotherhood as a power-hungry entity to the other ideological groups that differ from the Islamist political thought. Despite the fact that the council that was selected to change a few articles in the constitution were from a variety of ideological backgrounds, the media zoomed in on only 2 members: Sobhi Saleh (a member of the Brotherhood and a legal expert and lawyer) and Tareq AlBishry (though not a member of any Islamist organization, yet an Islamist-leaning legal expert).
The other splitting point of the constitutional-amendment predicament was that the amendments called for early parliamentary elections before the creation of a constitution, and also noted that the parliament would elect the members of a constitutional assembly that would write Egypt’s new constitution. Although the objective was to speed up the transfer of authority to a civil government, political opponents of the Brotherhood objected to that for the fact that it was predicted that the Brotherhood would win the majority of seats in the parliament. And so the media focused on those aspects as well.
In the game of politics, in order to win against an opponent, it is best to understand his way of thinking, his objectives, and what would either stop him from reaching those objectives or delay them until you gain a better ground.
The old system understood it from the start: The Muslim Brotherhood wants the transfer of power from the Military Council to be transferred to a civil government as soon as possible, with parliamentary elections to take place at the earliest possible date. And so all was done to delay both of those objectives.
Events took place in ways that were aimed to instigate the revolutionary anger among the youth. And at each event, the young revolutionists would run down to the streets and protest, and the old system would begin killing, fuelling the fires of anger even more.
And at each event, the Brotherhood would take a step back and refrain from participating in the protests. The youth would interpret lack of action and participation as either a deal struck with the Military Council, or simply selling out the revolution for personal gains. The Brotherhood would claim that the event was a bait to lure members of the Brotherhood in and create a status of greater chaos and blame it on the Brotherhood.
And again, the media would portray the Brotherhood as both striking deals with the ruling powers and selling out the revolution for personal gains, ruining the public image of the Brotherhood more.
And so the parliamentary elections finally took place. The Muslim Brotherhood won the most significant majority (though not the absolute majority, the 50%+1). Only to face 3 more obstacles.
The first of these obstacles came in the form of a chaotic aftermath of a soccer match that ended in a bloody massacre. The parliament created a fact-finding group. The media, again, played into the hands of the old system, belittling the efforts of the parliament.
The second of these obstacles was a militarily-chosen government that remained so complacent that it actually had negative impact on a country that was already struggling from revolutionary stress. And so with current crises on one hand, demands for revolutionary legislations on another, and demands for the toppling of the government on yet another, and with media focusing its lenses on the negativity of the parliament, the public image of the Muslim Brotherhood (despite sharing the parliamentary burden with other political entities) continued to decline.
The Muslim Brotherhood then made an attempt to improve its public image. It publicly demanded the Military Council to dissolve the government. However, with the media’s ever-focus on the Brotherhood, this act was portrayed as an attempt at reaching for more power, rather than calling for a transfer of power to a civil-selected government.
In a similar publicly-announced demand, the Muslim Brotherhood publicly questioned the Military Council’s intentions. In response, the Military Council, in a threatening tone, called on the Brotherhood to learn from ‘historical mistakes.’ That was a clear reference to a campaign of mass arrests of members of the Brotherhood in 1954. Surprisingly, the media considered those statements to be merely an act for the public and without real substance.
Then came perhaps the most controversial move the Muslim Brotherhood ever made: it chose from among its members a candidate for the presidential elections (when it had previously stated it wouldn’t). Khairat ElShater, known by many as the political and economic mastermind of the organization, was chosen by a majority vote by the Brotherhood. (This was most probably the Brotherhood’s response to the threat made by the military council.) And, of course, the media attacked the Brotherhood for breaking its word.
And then, the conspiracy was exposed. Omar Suleiman, the former chief of intelligence and the vice president during a part of the 18 days of the revolution, announced that he would be running in the presidential elections. And the reason he stated for his nomination: To protect the revolution from the Muslim Brotherhood.
And rather than labeling Omar Suleiman as a former member of Mubarak’s inner circle, and rather than labeling his stated reason for running for elections as laughable (given that he was the chief of intelligence during the first few days of the revolution and the vice president through the remaining days, while Khairat ElShater was imprisoned and while the Brotherhood was participating in the protests), the media began to label him as a worthy candidate and a respectable individual.
These are, perhaps, the most crucial crossroads of the Egyptian revolution. It is that point in which all sides either make it or break it. It has reached the point where both the old system, the Muslim Brotherhood, and all who participated in the revolution, face the famous Shakespearean quote: To be or not to be.
If the old system gets out of this crucial point alive, it would most probably mean that the Brotherhood would face another 1954 scenario, and that anybody who took part in the revolution is a potential inmate at a prison, and that is to put it lightly.
A victory of the Brotherhood (or anybody supported by the Brotherhood or with close ties to them) would ultimately mean that the tombstone has finally been laid upon the burial spot of the old system.
This is the actual point that everybody spoke about when they mentioned that: A revolution never ends half way, and when it does, it ultimately means the end of the revolutionists.

I Shall Vote for Khairat ElShater

From the start, I wasn’t planning on voting for an Islamist to begin with. As a matter of fact, I remember, before the revolution, and during the Parliamentary Elections of 2010 to be exact, the main candidate I had in mind was Hamdeen Sabbahy.

Hamdeen Sabbahy was, from what I saw during the elections, the potential activist-presidential-candidate. His famous stance (side-by-side with Aboul-Fotouh) against Anwar ElSadat was by itself enough reason for much respect for him. His stance during the elections, running against NDP (National Democratic Party) candidates, was another reason I had much admiration for him. His pan-Arab perspective (I trademark of any true Nasserist) and his pro-Palestine stance were more reasons I was singling him as a potential candidate I would vote for.

But Divine Preordainment had it, that the revolution would take place, and along with it, the complete turnaround of politics in Egypt.

Perhaps, the greatest change that took place was unveiling of the Muslim Brotherhood (though never a true secret-society, as they had always been active on the streets and in politics, yet always labeled as political outcasts, extremists, militants, evil, and against all that is in the interest of the nation). No longer a banned illegal organization, the MB became a legal organization, and created a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party.

Amidst the protests the immediately followed Mubarak’s ousting, protests that mainly focused on the toppling of the Ahmed-Shafeeq cabinet and the closing of the National-Security force, the ruling military council, the SCAF, gave a medical pardon to a man named Khairat ElShater, ending his stay in military prisons, and ending, with it, injustice he suffered from the Mubarak regime in prisons on different occasions, with his stay in Mubarak’s prisons totaling to over a decade.

Khairat ElShater was one of the leading (and perhaps one of the most influential) members in one of Egypt’s most popular, organized, and widespread political organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood. And that still does not begin to describe his CV.

His political life started, not as an Islamist, but as a leftist in student political organizations. His first taste of injustice for speaking his mind came in the form of expulsion from the Alexandria University in 1968 for participating in student demonstrations. He was conscripted into the Egyptian Armed Forces before the legally-stated timing for military service, and during the War of Attrition.

He joined the MB in 1974.

In 1981, he was forced out of his position as a teaching assistant in the University of AlMansoura at the orders of Anwar AlSadat.

He, along with his business partner Hassan Malik, was imprisoned and had much of his invested wealth ceased in the case known as Salsabeel (named after the company he had co-owned and operated. The company was one of the largest and most innovative Arab IT companies at the time.)

In 1995, he was sentenced by a military court to 5 years in prison, and was imprisoned again for one year in 2001. In 2006, he, along with a number of MB members, were taken to a civilian court, and were found innocent of the charges. Mubarak then decided to have them tried at a military court, where he was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

His CV on LinkedIn.com is impressive, to say the least, both academically and professionally. He lists as his current positions co-founder and owner at 4 different companies and as principal owner of Salsabeel for Trading and Investment. Among the positions he previously held are: Board member at AlMohandes Bank, Board member at the International Bank for Development and Investment, Managing director at the International Company for Investment, and Consultant at Applied Microsystem Technology (AMT).

He obtained his Bachelor’s Degree in Engineering from the University of Alexandria and his Master’s Degree in the same field from the University of AlMansoura. He also obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Humanities from the Ain Shams University, as well as diplomas in the fields of Islamic Studies, Civil Society and Non-Government Organizations, Business Management, and International Marketing.

His political views, from what I have seen and heard, are Islamist, pragmatic, and modern at the same time. His economic and managerial experience is essential at this point in time, with the country experiencing economic and social confusion. His political experience in managing the Muslim Brotherhood and bringing it to the climax it is now reaching will definitely help in restructuring the political environment of the country and bring the various ideologies to some common interests and goals they can all work together to achieve. And his academic experience will also play its role in improving the development of the country.

There are, of course reasons for why I have chosen to vote for Khairat ElShater rather than the other candidates who are running in these elections. I will reserve the reasons for why I have selected him rather than a few of the other candidates for later. However, it is important to mention that I have definitely decided not to vote for Omar Suleiman, Ahmed Shafeeq, and Amr Moussa for the fact that they played essential roles during the corrupt reign of Hosni Mubarak. And I did not take part in a revolution that toppled a man, to find his former servants take control of the reins.

Such Fools We Are

Before a little over than a month ago, I still had some optimistic views regarding the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. After all, they obliged Hosni Mubarak to resign and refused orders from Mubarak to fire live bullets at the protesters. They also allowed the first free and transparent referendum in Egypt to take place. And, of course, all the ‘king’s men’ were arrested and sent to prison during SCAF’s reign.

But then skepticism started to get the better of me. The first reason for this was their increasing acceptance of the ‘above-constitutional articles,’ despite the fact that they claim that they stand at an equal distance from all parties. (And many parties and presidential candidates and political figures refuse the idea of those articles, given that they act as a ‘decree’ over the people’s will.) Then came Bastawisi’s version of those ‘above-constitutional’ articles and with it a nice piece of sweets for the Supreme Council: The army becomes an ‘assurer’ of those articles, and ‘protects’ the constitution. (This isn’t a secret or a rumor, Hesham ElBastawisi himself announced it, and, when asked once about it, he even stated that it was to “reassure the army for a limited time, only.” As though we are in a position today to play tricks with the SCAF, and as though the SCAF won’t play tricks later when we try to cancel those articles.)

The first thing that came to mind as soon as I heard of Bastawisi’s proposal was Turkey before Erdogan. The army there was an assurer of the secularist identity of the nation, constitutionally speaking. But, of course, whenever any entity is placed in a position with unchecked power, there is no way you can question its exercising of that power. And because of that unchecked power, whenever a civil government in Turkey came to power and had interests that did not please the high-ranking officers, a coup would take place and the excuse would be, of course, safeguarding the secularist identity and the stability of the nation. Coups took place in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The ruling AK Party (The Justice and Development Party lead by Erdogan) uncovered a number of coup plots during recent years, yet they managed to prevent them by filing lawsuits against the officers who were responsible. That wasn’t the form of republic I was dreaming of while taking part in the revolution.

And, of course, we didn’t come up with a revolution against a military leader to be placed under the supervision of a military council for the next 100 years.

Another problem with Bastawisi’s proposal is related to the military budget. Rather than call for more transparency, Bastawisi proposes that we stick to the status quo: Their budget is only a figure in the nation’s budget, and only the top generals of the armed forces have the right to discuss and know any details of that figure. And so, we would be sitting for another 100 years knowing that a big portion of the US aid goes to the armed forces, and knowing that the armed forces has a humongous budget, yet not knowing anything about where that money is actually coming from and being spent on. We’d be placing absolutely blind trust in the army again. No change, really.

In addition, any laws being proposed that have anything to do with the armed forces, according to Bastawisi’s proposal, must be approved by the armed forces. 

The problem, however, is that, instead of ignoring these sweet treats and truly remaining at an equal distance from all parties and political entities, SCAF announced over a month ago that it had formed a committee that would come up with a list of guidelines (advices for the people, as though we aren’t ready enough for democracy, as Omar Suleiman once said) to guide us ‘unprepared’ and ‘foolish democracy-loving’ citizens when we form the constitution we (excuse me, I mean they) want the country to be ruled by. And of course, rather than stick to the original idea, that these guidelines were guidelines for how the constitution would be formed, the members of that committee (including Tohany ElGebaly, whom Hosni Mubarak, and, as rumor has it, Suzanne Mubarak, appointed as a member of the Supreme Constitutional Court) twisted it to become articles that guided the constitution itself, or, in other words, ‘above-constitutional’ articles.

Now let’s leave that issue, which is quite controversial, to the side. There is one issue that has exposed the SCAF, and it’s an issue we can all agree upon.

The recent Israeli ‘incident’ has proven (at least to me) that Mubarak-era foreign policies are still as they are. The SCAF’s refusal to bow to public pressure to show anger over the death of the Egyptian soldiers and officers by Israeli fire is the same as the Mubarak strategy of remaining silent when an Egyptian soldier or officer is killed and taking ‘monetary’ compensation instead, without a formal apology.

And the wording of the statement by the SCAF and the Ministries itself seemed absolutely repulsive, in my opinion. Rather than calling what Israel had committed a “crime” (جريمة), they referred to the event as merely an “incident” (حادث), as though the killing of a member of the Egyptian Armed Forces is something regretful, yet its occurrence is not out of the ordinary, just as car crashes are incidents that are regretful, but not out of the ordinary.

But the idea of kicking them out of authority at the moment is unreasonable. The main reason is that there is no other proper alternative other than to speed up the elections a bit. Presidential committees are unreasonable. Every committee the SCAF came up with for other purposes so far was extremely controversial, with about half of the political parties and figures in support of the members and the other half absolutely rejecting its formation in the first place. That is with regards to little law-forming and political-discussions committees. A committee that will govern Egypt will bring along with truckloads of controversy and problems that we are not in luxury to deal with during these times.

The SCAF, despite its current political games, is perhaps the most neutral entity that is capable of ruling the country for the interim period. (Judges are not fit to be politicians. They practice law, only making decisions when the issue is 100% certain, which isn’t the case with politics, where uncertainty is abound.)

The longer SCAF stays on the seats of authority, however, the longer they will be tempted to stay. Power has its problems, as it is one of the most addictive concepts to mankind so long as it remains unchecked. The SCAF currently holds the legislative (law-making) and executive (law-enforcing) powers in its hands, and in many instances flexes some judicial powers through its military courts. The longer we allow SCAF to stay in power, the more of a pharaoh we make out of it. For that reason it is in the best interests of this nation that we pull the election dates sooner, so the generals may return to their bases and leave the seats of power as soon as possible.

And to give them constitutional powers above the people’s will is to ruin the hopes of many who have really fought for a civil state away from the hands of the military.